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On 31 October 2017, the Australian-run Manus Island Regional Processing Centre (RPC), 
located at the Lombrum Naval Base in Papua New Guinea (PNG), officially closed its 
operations. At the time, 606 men still lived there. All of these men had been forcibly 
transferred by the Australian authorities from Australia to PNG and detained at the centre at 
some point during the proceeding four years. Most of these men had subsequently been found 
to be refugees by the PNG immigration authorities. As part of the centre’s closure, the PNG 
and Australian authorities insisted that the men either return to their state of origin (an 
unviable option for people recognised as having a ‘well-founded’ fear of persecution in their 
home state) or relocate to a new temporary accommodation facility – the then unfinished East 
Lorengau Refugee Transit Centre (RTC) – in the hope of being resettled in a third country. 
The fallacy of this ‘choice’ was exacerbated by a lack of available third-country resettlement 
options: either await the slim possibility of formal resettlement under a fledging and much-
criticised arrangement with the United States or accept integration to the local PNG 
community which offered little prospects of employment or long-term livelihood. Instead, 
most men opted to remain inside the RPC after its closure and continue to protest the 
prolonged state of legal limbo and political abandonment that had been inflicted upon them. 
Organising collectively around the centre’s closure, they publicly demanded that the 
Australian government recognise its political, legal and moral responsibility toward them. 
Materially, the centre’s closure meant that the provision of essentials such as food, water and 
medical supplies to the men, who refused to leave the centre’s grounds, effectively ceased. 
The decision to remain in the centre thus instigated three weeks of intense resistance within 
the RPC, characterised by state orchestrated starvation, creative self-reliance, organised 
protest and imminent terror. The prominent award-winning Kurdish journalist and film-
maker Behrouz Boochani, who himself had been detained as a refugee on Manus Island since 
July 2013 and who vividly chronicled the closing of the centre in his “Diary of a Disaster” 
published via The Guardian, outlined one mantra that united the men during this time: ‘We 
will never retreat and leave this prison of hell. We will never move to another prison. We will 
never settle for anything less than freedom. Only freedom.’1 
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In this chapter, I locate the struggles around the closure of the Manus Island RPC in the 
context of broader legal, political and economic contestations surrounding Australia’s 
punitive offshore refugee detention regime in PNG. I argue that Australia’s draconian 
policies of offshore processing have increasingly sought to place the economics of 
immigration detention outside of the realm of domestic political debate and to obfuscate the 
Australian state’s obligations under international refugee law. These policies have done this 
through two key strategies of outsourcing and offshoring that have both, in different ways, 
devolved legal and practical responsibility for the management and processing of asylum 
seekers to private corporations and external state authorities. In the most recent iteration of 
Australia’s offshore detention regime, this mix of external public and private actors has 
included two neighbouring island states (PNG and Nauru), transnational private companies 
(G4S, IHMS, Transfield, and Wilson Security) and non-governmental organisations 
(Salvation Army and Save the Children). However, as the events of October 2017 
demonstrate, the Australian government’s practices of exclusion and expulsion have been met 
with a series of mass refugee protests and practices of claim-making from the men held 
within the Manus Island RPC that instead insisted upon articulating relationships of political, 
legal and moral responsibility towards the authorities that exercise control over their lives and 
futures. One site where such forms of refugee claim-making have been articulated is in court 
litigation, both in Australia and PNG. I examine two recent legal challenges initiated by and 
on behalf of the affected refugees that have shaped the political struggle around the legality 
and legitimacy of Australia’s regional offshore detention regime. At the time of writing, these 
series of legal litigations have not (yet) been successful in bringing about an end to 
Australia’s offshore processing regime, and the plights and protests of the asylum seekers and 
refugees who are subjected to this violent and harmful regime remain ongoing. 
 
Australia’s Deterrence Paradigm: The Structural Violence of Outsourcing, the 
Diffusion of Responsibility 
Australia has maintained a policy of mandatorily detaining asylum seekers who arrive in its 
territory unauthorised by boat –that is, without a valid visa—since 1992. Initially adopted in 
response to increasing unauthorised boat arrivals of Indochinese asylum seekers from the late 
1980s onwards, this mandatory detention policy has become a central pillar of Australia’s 
increasingly draconian approach towards asylum seekers. At the time of its introduction, the 
policy was justified as a temporary practice necessary to maintain the ‘integrity’ of 
Australia’s migration program, drawing inspiration from state practices of asylum seeker 
deterrence and boat push-backs elsewhere.2 Successive Australian governments have 
maintained this policy in the face of sustained criticism from both domestic civil society and 
international authorities. Internationally, the UN Human Rights Committee, for example, has 
repeatedly stated that the mandatory indefinite detention of certain asylum seekers and 
refugees amounts to systematic human rights breaches and was ‘cumulatively inflicting 
																																								 																				
2 Daniel Ghezelbash, Asylum Lost (CUP, 2018).  
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serious, irreversible psychological harm’.3 Domestically, political opposition to the 
legitimacy and viability of these centres has been expressed through, for instance, widespread 
detainee protests, including hunger strikes and riots within detention facilities, and 
accompanying mass civil society mobilisations in the early 2000s.4 
The introduction of mandatory detention quickly gave rise to a complex institutional 
infrastructure of immigration detention centres, including in notoriously remote locations 
such as the Woomera Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (1999-2003) situated in 
the Australian central desert. Initially, these immigration detention centres were run by an 
agency within the Australian  Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs (DIMIA). A significant shift occurred in 1996, when the conservative government 
under Prime Minister John Howard announced its intention to engage private companies to 
manage the network of centres with the stated aim of ‘deliver[ing] quality detention services 
with ongoing cost reduction’.5 In February 1998, the first contract for running Australia’s 
then network of seven immigration detention centres was awarded to Australasian 
Correctional Services (ACS), an Australian-based company would eventually become a 
subsidiary of the multinational Group 4 Securicor (G4S).6 ACS ran the so-called ‘Detention 
Services Contract’ for six years at a cost of over half a billion Australian dollars.7 Despite this 
huge expenditure, the number of people travelling to Australia unauthorised by boat during 
the first decade of mandatory detention remained relatively low compared to global asylum 
trends.8 
Australia was among the first states to fully privatise the running of immigration detention 
centres, following earlier moves to outsource certain immigration detention functions in the 
UK and US.9 Like elsewhere, the privatisation of Australia’s immigration detention network 
has had two key effects: first, that public funds have been used to generate increasing profits 
for private companies, and second, the formal devolution and diffusion of practical and legal 
responsibility, whereby the private contractor – and not the state – holds primary 
responsibility for ‘delivering’ certain ‘services’ to asylum seekers.10 Importantly, the use of 
private companies to run immigration detention centres has not resulted in reduced 
																																								 																				
3 FKAG v Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/108/D/2094/2011 (20 August 2013) and MMM v Australia, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/108/D/2136/2012 (20 August 2013). 
4 See Lucy Fiske, Human Rights, Refugee Protest and Immigration Detention (Palgrave, 2016). 
5 ANAO, Management of the Detention Centres Contracts (Part A). 2003-04 (Audit Report, 2004) 13. 
6 While the Australian government contract was with ACS, the detention centres were run through its 
operational subsidiary Australasian Correctional Management (ACM). At the time, ACS was a subsidiary of the 
American-based company Wackenhut Corrections Services (WCC). The initial contract was for three years, 
with a possibility of extension.  
7 ANAO, Management of the Detention Centres Contracts (Part A). 2003-04 (Audit Report, 2004) 12. In 2003, 
DIMIA entered into a three year detention services contract with a new provider, GSL, valued at $100 million 
per year. ANAO, Management of the Detention Centres Contracts (Part B) (Report, 2005) 18. 
8 Government statistics indicate that, in 1995-96, there were only 693 people in immigration detention, although 
this number would rise significantly to peak at 9,321 people (including 1224 children) in immigration detention 
in 2001-02. Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, Immigration detention in Australia (Department of Parliamentary 
Services Background Note, March 2013). 
9 Michael Flynn and Cecilia Cannon, The Privatization of Immigration Detention: Towards a Global View (A 
Global Detention Project Working Paper, September 2009).  
10 Michael Welch, ‘Economic Man and Diffused Sovereignty: A Critique of Australia’s Asylum Regime’ (2014) 
61(1) Crime, Law and Social Change 81, 88. 
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government bureaucracy, the provision of quality care to asylum seekers nor the complete 
evasion of legal liability on the part of the Australian government. For example, a 2004 
government review of the ACS contract found that the arrangement failed to define the 
nature, quality and level of services required of ACS and lacked sufficient mechanisms to 
allow DIMIA to monitor ACS conduct. It also noted that the division within DIMIA 
responsible for managing detention centre contracts exponentially grew from 15 staff in 1998 
to 150 staff in 2004.11 Similarly, despite the privatisation of services, Australian courts have 
held that the Australian government still retains a legal duty of care towards asylum seekers 
in detention to exercise reasonable care for their safety, a duty which cannot be contracted out 
to external providers.12 Consequently, the Australian government paid out over AU$5 million 
between 1999 and 2012 in compensation to former detainees who suffered physical injuries 
or psychological damage while in detention.13  
More recently, successive Australian governments have further sought to externalise their 
responsibility towards asylum seekers and refugees through the implementation of a policy of 
so-called ‘offshore processing’. This policy of ‘offshore processing’ has had two distinct 
phrases: the Pacific Solution Mark I (2001 – 2008 implemented under the Coalition 
government led by Prime Minister Howard) and the Pacific Solution Mark II (2012 – 
ongoing, first implemented under the Gillard Labor government and maintained under the 
subsequent Coalition governments).14 Notably, when the newly-elected Rudd Labor 
government announced the end of the first Pacific Solution in 2007, the Immigration Minister 
denounced the policy of offshore processing as a ‘cynical, costly and ultimately unsuccessful 
exercise’.15 In the previous seven years of implementing offshore detention and processing, 
the Australian government had contracted the International Organization for Migration to 
administer the detention facilities on Manus Island and Nauru – at an estimated total cost of 
$289 million – while the Australian immigration authorities conducted refugee status 
determinations. 
The reintroduction of Australia’s offshore detention regime in August 2012 has signalled a 
new phrase in Australia’s approach to asylum seeker deterrence that instrumentalises 
humanitarian concerns about migrant deaths to further practices of border securitisation. 
Justified under the rhetoric of ‘saving lives at sea’ following an increase in migrant 
drownings alongside the rise in unauthorised arrivals in previous years,16 the reestablishment 
																																								 																				
11 ANAO, Management of the Detention Centres Contracts (Part A). 2003-04 (Audit Report, 2004) 23-4. 
12 See eg Behrooz v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] 
HCA 36; AS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] VSC 593. 
13 This number is much higher for compensation claims concerning unlawful detention, amounting to over $18 
million for the same period. See Department of Finance and Deregulation, Australian Government, 
Compensation claims made by immigration detainees between 1999 and 2011 (FOI Request, 2012). It is 
difficult to ascertain the precise details of these cases as most successful compensation cases have been settled 
out of court. 
14 For an overview of these two distinct phases, see Anthea Vogl, ‘Sovereign Relations: Australia's 'Off-shoring' 
of Asylum Seekers on Nauru in Historical Perspective’ in Charlotte Epstein (ed), Norming the World: 
Postcolonial Perspectives on the Use of Norms in International Relations (Routledge, 2017) 158. 
15 Paul Maley, ‘Pacific Solution Sinks Quietly’, The Australian (9 February 2008), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/news/pacific-solution-sinks-quietly/news-
story/507ebc9ecc06316fe3eb131a9333583a?sv=1d6c4928265abd42219ab312c0635bc6  
16 Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers (2012) 9. 
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of offshore processing was soon accompanied by a military-led campaign to turn-back 
asylum seeker boat at sea, and a political pledge to never allow asylum seekers arriving 
unauthorised by boat to settle in or even visit Australia.17 As Michael Grewcock argues, 
central to Australia’s draconian deterrence model is a ‘conceptual approach to refugees that 
deprives them of agency and vests legitimacy only in those willing to comply with border 
controls’.18 
Regionally, the revamped offshore detention regime was implemented through a series of 
agreements with two small Pacific Island neighbouring states to Australia’s north and several 
private contractors willing to provide a range of services such as those classified as 
‘garrison’, welfare and health in the newly re-established RPCs. In mid-2012, the Australian 
government concluded two Memorandums of Understanding, one with PNG and the other 
with Nauru, for the transfer and detention of asylum seekers from Australia.19 Under both 
MoUs, the Australian government bears all the costs incurred for implementing regional 
detention and processing (including construction and operation costs), while the PNG and 
Nauruan governments are responsible for instituting the refugee status determination process 
in accordance with their respective domestic law. Australian officials often cite this 
jurisdictional arrangement as a way of seeking to deflect legal responsibility for the 
predicament of the people subject to its offshore detention regime, from uncertainty 
surrounding their future resettlement to the conditions they face in detention.20 In exchange, 
Australia significantly increased its aid to both states, including funding major infrastructure 
projects.  
While the RPCs are officially ‘operated’ by the PNG and Nauruan governments, the 
Australian government has practical authority over the running and management of the RPCs 
via contracts with private companies and NGOs. Initially, the Australian government 
contracted G4S to manage Manus Island RPC, with welfare services provided by two 
globally-networked NGOs: The Salvation Army and Save the Children Australia. From mid-
2014 to October 2017, this lucrative contract was awarded to the Australian-listed company 
Transfield (known as Broadspectrum from November 2015), for a combined value of over 
																																								 																				
17 In July 2013, the Australia government under new Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that no asylum 
seeker or refugee subject to offshore processing would be resettled in Australia. In addition, since the election of 
the Coalition government in November 2013, Australia has adopted a policy of turning back asylum seeker 
boats at sea. While in clear breach of the fundamental international norm of non-refoulement, this practice has 
drastically reduced the number of people able to travel to the Australian mainland by boat to seek asylum. As a 
result, Australia has not transferred new arrivals to PNG or Manus Island since 2014. See Sara Dehm and Max 
Walden, ‘Refugee Policy: A Cruel Bipartisanship’ in Anika Gauja et al, Double Disillusion: The 2016 
Australian Federal Election (ANU e-Press, 2018). 
18 Michael Grewcock, ‘“Our Lives Is in Danger”: Manus Island and the End of Asylum’ (2017) 59(2) Race & 
Class 70, 75. 
19 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Independent State of PNG and the 
Government of Australia, relating to the Transfer to and Assessment of Persons in PNG, and Related Issues 
(September 2012), superseded by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the 
Independent State of PNG and the Government of Australia, relating to the Transfer to, and Assessment and 
Resettlement in, PNG of Certain Persons, and Related Issues (July 2013). 
20 Nonetheless, under these arrangements, refugees and asylum seekers on Manus Island and Nauru may be 
temporarily brought back to Australia in certain circumstances such as for giving birth or specialised medical 
treatment.  
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AU$3 billion.21 Under the terms of this contract, Transfield became responsible for the day-
to-day operations of the RPCs including providing security, cleaning, catering, and individual 
welfare and health services. As a result, Transfield exercised practical and quasi-sovereign 
authority over the lives of the people living in RPCs, making ‘decisions about detainee 
welfare, placement, movement, communication, accommodation, food, clothing, water, 
security and environment on a daily basis’.22 A 2015 report authored by a group of Australian 
lawyers, researchers and human rights activists under the No Business in Abuse initiative held 
that, while the Australian authorities appear to ‘have ultimate authority for some decisions 
under the terms of the contracts, there can be no doubt that without Transfield and its 
subcontractors the operation of the ODCs would be impossible’.23 At the peak of the 
transfers, in November 2013, the number of people detained in the Manus Island RPC 
reached 1,339 men. The following year, an Australian Senate report noted that conditions at 
the Manus Island RPC were ‘harsh, inadequate and inhumane’, including ‘cramped and over-
heated sleeping quarters, exposure to the weather, poor sanitation and sewage blockages, 
unhygienic meals and poorly managed service of meals’.24   
In recent years, the logic of border security has sat ambivalently alongside the global upsurge 
of discourses of state austerity and fiscal responsibility. The findings of the National 
Commission of Audit, established by the Australian Treasurer in 2013 with the purpose of 
examining the ‘scope and efficiency’ of government finances, present an illustrative example. 
While asserting that the Australian government’s faced a ‘substantial budgetary challenge’ 
and required a reduction in state spending, the Commission failed to question the legitimacy 
or underlying basis of expenditure on immigration detention per se. Although it recognised 
that Australia’s immigration detention regime was the ‘fastest growing’ government 
programme in recent years, the Commission merely recommended the renegotiation of 
contracts and ‘better targeting of services’ in order to reduce the cost of detaining people 
within both the onshore and offshore facilities, rather than a more radical overhaul of the 
contractual relationships or the costly policy of mandatory immigration detention and 
offshore processing.25 Border security is thus presented as an economic and technocratic 
necessity that must be accepted and managed rather than eliminated, even by proponents of 
austerity.  
																																								 																				
21 ANAO, Offshore Processing Centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea: Procurement of Garrison Support 
and Welfare Services (September 2016) 7. This figure is until March 2016. In reality, the contract between the 
Australian government and Transfield was a series of contracts, starting in 2012 for the running of the Nauru 
RPC, before signing another single contract to become the sole provider of garrison support and welfare services 
for both RPCs in October 2015. This contract was extended on two occasions, in February 2016 and August 
2016.   
22 No Business in Abuse Report (2015) 22. 
23 No Business in Abuse Report (2015) 22. See also Brynn O’Brien, ‘Extraterritorial Detention Contracting in 
Australia and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights 
Journal 333. 
24 Australian Senate, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Incident at the Manus Island Detention 
Centre from 16 February to 18 February 2014 (Report, December 2014), 
https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/senate/legal_and_constitutional_affairs/manus_isla
nd/Report/c03. 
25 Towards Responsible Government: The Report of the National Commission of Audit (Commonwealth 
Government, February 2014) lviii. 
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In contrast, refugee sector advocates have sought to frame Australia’s punitive policies of 
offshore detention within an economic cost-benefit framework as one means of 
delegitimising them. Since 2012, the cost of Australia’s offshore detention regime has been a 
routine target of civil society criticism and media attention. For example, in September 2016, 
Save the Children and UNICEF Australia released a joint report, At What Costs?, that 
documented the human, economic and strategic costs of Australia’s offshore processing 
regime, estimating that Australia spent at least AU$9.6 billion (US$7.3 billion) between 2013 
and 2016 funding deterrence policies including boat turn-backs, offshore processing, and 
mandatory immigration detention.26 Paradoxically, this criticism was articulated by one of the 
very NGOs previously contracted by the Australian government to provide ‘welfare services’ 
to asylum seekers on Nauru between 2013 and 2015.27  
In making the case for a less punitive policy approach, civil society efforts have also drawn 
attention to the economic benefits and contributions that refugee communities do and could 
further make, if Australia abandoned its policy of mandatory and offshore processing and 
allowed asylum seekers and refugees greater labour market participation and community 
integration. One risk with this campaign strategy is that hospitality becomes connected to 
economic motivations, and the validity of a person’s presence in a host country linked to the 
size of their economic contributions—thus imposing additional standards onto asylum 
seekers and refugees that not all are able to, or want to, meet. This shift in public debate from 
legal to economic arguments has also been championed and exploited by successive 
Australian governments as a way of delegitimising the claims of refugees and justifying the 
increasingly draconian and exclusionary approach towards asylum seekers. For example, 
successive Australian governments have depicted asylum seekers travelling to Australia 
unauthorised by boat as profit-seeking actors, rather than rights-claiming individuals.28 In 
such contestations over the economics of asylum, asylum seekers only figure in a binary 
framework: either as deserving individuals that generate profit for and benefit the Australian 
state and community, or as underserving individuals who seek to exploit and extract from it. 
 
#SOSManus: Refugee Protests, Court Litigation and Articulating Relations of 
Responsibility 
																																								 																				
26 Save the Children and UNICEF, At What Cost? The Human, Economic and Strategic Cost of Australia’s 
Asylum Seeker Policies and the Alternatives (Report, September 2016) 
http://www.unicef.org.au/Upload/UNICEF/Media/Documents/At-What-Cost-Report.pdf. See also similar report 
by Amnesty International in same year: Amnesty International, Islands of Despair: Australia’s “Processing” of 
Refugees on Nauru (Report, October 2016), https://www.amnesty.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISLAND-
OF-DESPAIR-FINAL.pdf  
27 Save the Children’s initial one year contract awarded in 2013 was valued at approximately AU$30 million. 
Save the Children’s contract was not renewed after it expired on 31 October 2015 and Transfield (now 
Broadspectrum) took over the contractual responsibility for providing ‘welfare services’ to refugees and asylum 
seekers on Nauru. 
28 See, eg, Ministerial comments about Sri Lankan asylum seekers as ‘economic migrants’ or ‘wealthy’ Iranian 
‘economic refugees’: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/28/rudd-government-asylum-seeker-policy; 
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/sep/28/peter-dutton-lets-fly-at-armani-clad-economic-
refugees-sent-to-us  
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The global proliferation of neoliberal policies from the 1990s onwards has not led to a 
reduction in punitive or disciplinary state functions.29 While neoliberalism purports to create 
a liberalised economy and self-regulating market, it in fact rests upon practices of 
criminalisation, confinement and risk-dissemination. Such strategies also animate Australia’s 
offshore processing regime, wherein the government seeks to export risks and escape 
responsibility for processing asylum claims and protecting refugees in keeping with 
international and domestic law. While this ‘ambiguous architecture of risk’ has made it 
increasingly difficult for affected asylum seekers to challenge Australia’s practices of refugee 
deterrence and border control,30 its offshore detention regime has been contested through 
civil and constitutional litigation in both Australian and PNG courts. Two court cases in 
particular – both initiated by or on behalf of asylum seekers and refugees at the Manus Island 
RPC – have transformed the broader political terrain. These cases were brought against state 
authorities and the corporations running the offshore detention camps.  
The first case, initiated in December 2014, was a class action for negligence instigated in the 
Victorian Supreme Court by Iranian asylum seeker Majid Kamasaee on behalf of all people 
who had been detained at the Manus Island RPC over the previous two years.31 The torts 
claim was brought against the Australian government and the two private contractors 
(Transfield/Broadspectrum and G4S) that had been responsible for the management of the 
Manus RPC over the claim period.32 Mr Kamasaee had himself been forcibly transferred to 
PNG around August 2013 but had been returned to Australia in July 2014 for medical 
treatment. A key argument was that the responsible parties had failed to provide people 
detained at the RPC with a reasonable standard of services – measured in relation to 
Australian community expectations – or a reasonable level of protection from ‘physical 
violence or intimidation, discrimination, ostracisms, bullying or other anti-social behaviour’ 
from other detainees or third parties.33 This failure, the claim alleged, was particularly 
harmful given the shared characteristics of the individuals detained, namely people with 
‘complex’ asylum claims who had or were likely to have fled violence and travelled to 
Australia under dangerous circumstances.34  
In July 2017, just one day before the case was due to be heard in the Victorian Supreme court 
(including allowing for global live streaming), it was announced that an out-of-court 
settlement had been reached, with the Australian government agreeing to pay a reported 
																																								 																				
29 Georg Menz, ‘Neo-Liberalism, Privatization and the Outsourcing of Migration Management: A Five-Country 
Comparison’ (2011) 15(2) Competition & Change 116, 117. 
30 Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering, Globalization and Borders: Death at the Global Frontier (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) 163. See also Sharon Pickering and Leanne Weber, ‘Hardening the Rule of Law and Asylum 
Seekers: Exporting Risk and the Juridical Censure of State Illegality’ in Elizabeth Stanley and Jude McCulloch 
(eds), State Crime and Resistance (Routledge, 2013) 183. 
31 The claim initially concerned personal injury but was later expanded to cover the additional count of false 
imprisonment.  See further Gabrielle Holly, ‘Transnational Tort and Access to Remedy under the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Kamasaee v Commonwealth’ (2018) 19 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 52.  
32 Wilson Security was also joined at a later stage as a third party to the litigation. 
33 Statement of Claim, Kamasaee v Commonwealth (Victorian Supreme Court, No 06770, 2014). 
34 See Statement of Claim, Kamasaee v Commonwealth (Victorian Supreme Court, No 06770, 2014). 
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AU$70 million in compensation and damages to the affected class of asylum seekers.35 Said 
to be the largest human rights class action settled by the Australian government to date, 1,905 
people detained on Manus Island between 2012 and 2016 were eligible for financial 
compensation. Speaking to the Australian media at the time, Mr Kamasaee said that ‘Our 
voices have never been listened to, but today we are finally being heard and I hope 
everyone’s suffering can be over as quickly as possible’.36 Other affected asylum seekers and 
refugees stressed the symbolic importance of the action as a powerful public 
acknowledgment that the conditions in Australia’s offshore detention regime are abusive, 
harmful and ultimately unlawful.37 Yet, as the case was resolved through an out-of-court 
settlement, volumes of evidence documenting the conditions and experiences of the asylum 
seekers and refugees on Manus Island went unheard in open court, allowing the Australian 
government to maintain the fallacy that the settlement is not an admission of legal liability 
nor wrongdoing but rather a ‘prudent’ use of taxpayer dollars to avoid a lengthy trial.38 Most 
importantly, the out-of-court settlement did nothing to commit the Australia government to 
redressing the ongoing harms inflicted upon those who remained in the RPC, specifically the 
political uncertainty about their legal status or their futures. As Pakistani refugee Naeem 
stated, when expressing his disappointment in the settlement, ‘[m]oney cannot [give me] back 
the four years of my life that I have lost, without committing any crime’.39 While the case 
was brought against the government and private contractors alike, it is unclear whether the 
settlement commits Transfield/Broadspectrum or G4S to pay any compensation—
demonstrating yet again how the legal architecture of outsourcing allows for public funds to 
generate private profit while the legal liability for compensation rests with the public 
authorities and public expense. 
A second case concerning the legality of the Manus Island RPC was brought before the PNG 
courts in 2015, by Belden Namah, the then PNG opposition leader. In April 2016, the PNG 
Supreme Court declared the Manus Island RPC to be unconstitutional, in part because it 
limited the right to freedom of movement enshrined in the PNG Constitution.40 At that point, 
the RPC was a ‘closed’ centre with secure fencing that resembled a prison, which detained 
men on an indefinite basis with only a few, limited, so-called ‘excursions’. A day after the 
																																								 																				
35 Ben Doherty and Calla Wahlquist, ‘Government to pay $70m damages to 1,905 Manus detainees in class 
action’, The Guardian (14 June 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jun/14/government-
to-pay-damages-to-manus-island-detainees-in-class-action  
36 Ibid. 
37 See, eg, interview with Behrouz Boochani in Martin McKenzie-Murray, ‘The wrong kind of settlement’, The 
Saturday Paper (17 June 2017), https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/politics/2017/06/17/the-wrong-
kind-settlement/14976216004800.  
38 See Immigration Minister Peter Dutton’s remarks that ‘An anticipated six-month legal battle for this case 
would have cost tens of millions of dollars in legal fees alone, with an unknown outcome’ in Michael Koziol, 
‘Court approves $70 million compensation payout to Manus Island detainee’, Sydney Morning Herald (6 
September 2017), https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/court-approves-70-million-compensation-payout-to-
manus-island-detainees-20170906-gybpjy.html.  
39 Stefan Armbruster, ‘Refugees afraid, confused as Manus detention centre shutdown begins’, ABC News (9 
July 2017), https://www.sbs.com.au/news/refugees-afraid-confused-as-manus-detention-centre-shutdown-begins  
40 Namah v Pato [2016] PGSC 13; SC1497 (26 April 2016). For a detailed earlier analysis of the case, see 
Azadeh Dastyari and Maria O-Sullivan, ‘Not For Export: The Failure of Australia’s Extraterritorial Processing 
Regime in Papua New Guinea and the Decision of the PNG Supreme Court in Namah (2016)’ 42 Monash 
University Law Review 308. 
10	
	
court ruling, the PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill announced the impending closure of the 
Manus Island RPC and urged Australia to ‘immediately’ make alternative arrangements for 
the affected men.41 As an interim measure, the RPC was transformed into an ‘open’ centre, 
allowing those living there to leave the compound during the day.42 While some transport 
was provided for the men to access Lorengau township, ongoing tensions in the local 
community over the politics and socio-economic impact of the Manus Island RPC meant that 
the men’s movement was constrained by security concerns. Given this change in the centre’s 
operation, in March 2017, the PNG Supreme Court Chief Justice declared that the Manus 
Island RPC had as a matter of law been closed, and that the ‘transferees’ were in fact being 
accommodated at the Lombrum Navy base by the PNG government with the assistance of the 
Australian government.43 His declaration effectively removed any legal obligation to relocate 
the refugees to a different facility in PNG. Nonetheless, in April 2017, the PNG and 
Australian Prime Ministers jointly announced that the Manus Island RPC would cease its 
operations on 31 October that year, a move partly seen as a way of accelerating and 
incentivising the integration of refugees in the PNG community.44 The closure date of 31 
October 2017 coincided, not-coincidentally, with the end of Broadspectrum’s contract with 
the Australian government. 
The physical closure of the RPC was protracted and brutal. Australian government-contracted 
service providers, at the behest of the state, attempted to force the asylum seekers and 
refugees to ‘voluntarily’ relocate to the new facilities by dismantling sections of the RPC and 
denying services. By May 2017, five months ahead of the official closure, facilities including 
the telephone room had been removed, and the provision of power, water, cleaning services 
and food reduced across the RPC.45 Small ‘luxuries’ such as cigarettes, tea, sugar, coffee, 
fruit, English language classes, internet and gym access also ceased. This deliberate 
withdrawal of essential services authorised by both Australian and PNG authorities and the 
companies contracted to run the RPC manifested a form of ‘slow violence’ that deprived the 
affected asylum seekers and refugees of the necessary conditions for life over a protracted 
period.46  
																																								 																				
41 Stephanie Anderson, ‘Manus Island detention centre to be shut, Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter 
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In response, at the start of August 2017, the men living in the Manus Island RPC began a 
daily protest that called upon the Australian government to acknowledge its responsibility for 
their basic rights, their conditions of detention and their future resettlement. Each day, the 
men uploaded photos and at times videos of their collective protests on social media, using 
handwritten signs in English highlight the brutality and hypocrisy of the Australian 
government’s purported humanitarianism, including messages such as: 
Australia, why are you killing us? 
The Government of Australia evades its responsibility towards us 
The Government of Australia claims Humanity but where its humanity? 
In anticipation of the Manus Island RPC closure, the Australian government contracted the 
multinational global logistics company Toll Group to expand an existing facility – the East 
Lorengau RTC – and build two additional centres, in order to transfer men from the Manus 
Island RPC. The contract was valued at AU$30 million.47 Yet by the Australian 
government’s own admission, the new accommodation remained unfinished just days prior to 
the RPC’s closure, prompting the UNHCR to condemn the relocation policy, stating as late as 
November that the new facilities were still ‘incomplete, sub-standard… and unsanitary’.48 As 
an inducement to move, the refugees were told that those who relocated to the East Lorengau 
RTC would be given a weekly allowance. Yet many of the refugees expressed concerns that 
the new temporary accommodation was not a viable or safe alternative, citing fears about 
their personal safety given escalating tensions between the Manus locals and the refugees in 
the previous years as well as the local lack of prospects for future livelihoods.49 One such 
violent incident had resulted in the murder of Kurdish asylum seeker Reza Barati in February 
2014, who was beaten to death by local G4S employees while inside the Manus Island RPC.  
By the time Broadspectrum and Wilson Security staff left on the 31 October official closure 
date, the protests were in their 91st continuous day. The men had developed a sustained 
campaign of collective resistance from within the Manus Island RPC that was connected with 
refugee advocates and supporters in PNG, Australia and elsewhere. In the days that followed, 
the men occupied the decommissioned RPC, enduring starvation, infections, threats and 
incursions from the PNG military into the centre to sabotage already limited water and food 
supplies. Nonetheless, through their embodied protest the men asserted a form of autonomy 
against the authorities that had controlled their lives in the RPC, refusing to be yet again 
relocated against their will. As one Sudanese refugee Abdul Aziz Muhamat shared via a 
collaborative podcast he made with Australian journalist Michael Green, the occupation of 
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the RPC provided an opportunity for people to become ‘united’ through their endurance of 
hardship and their acts of defiance and self-determination: 
we are looking after each other more than even before. It’s been like more than 4 and 
a half years we never had any opportunity to do so… every single man in detention 
now are contributing [by building wells, doing security around centre]… we are using 
that kind of resistance and the resilience that we have … we are paying the price of 
our freedom.50 
On 7 November 2017, a week after the official closure of the Manus Island RPC, the PNG 
Supreme Court rejected a last-ditch legal application lodged on behalf of Behrouz Boochani 
to force the PNG state to restore essential services such as power, water, food, sanitation and 
medical services to the centre.51 Responding to the decision, Boochani wrote on social media 
that ‘We the refugees in Manus are outside of law and justice. There is no justice for the 
refugees and we are used to the court decisions going against us.’52  
The defiant standoff continued, lasting three weeks until the PNG military violently evicted 
the men and forced them to relocate to the new facilities. Amnesty International termed the 
standoff a ‘humanitarian crisis of the Australian and PNG governments’ own making’, noting 
that the forced relocation of the men: 
was carried out in a demeaning and deeply humiliating manner – with refugees forced 
to relocate to newer, but still temporary, sites that were also poorly equipped, 
overcrowded, unsafe and lacking in basic services such as water and power. In effect, 
the refugees and asylum seekers have been shuttled from one prison-like centre to 
several others, with no improvement to their situation.53 
Ultimately, the forced relocations to the new facilities merely replaced one visible crisis with 
another, characterised by the underlying structural violence and ongoing legal uncertainty and 
political abandonment surrounding the future of the asylum seekers and refugees held on 
Manus Island. As Iranian refugee Mehdi Maleknia is reported to have said in the wake of the 
forced relocation, ‘Yes, it's a nicer prison. But what we want is not a nice place, we want our 
freedom’.54 
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Conclusion 
The forced closure of the Manus Island RPC in October 2017 made visible the physical 
brutality and produced suffering that animates Australia’s paradigm of asylum seeker 
deterrence. Less visible was the enduring structural violence that informed how the 
Australian state, through the dual strategies of contracting of private for-profit service 
providers and enrolling neighbouring states into its offshore detention regime, had created a 
situation of calculated legal limbo and prolonged abandonment for the refugees on Manus 
Island and Nauru. In this chapter, I have traced the evolution of Australia’s offshore 
processing regime in relation to broader trends and effects concerning the privatisation of 
Australian immigration detention centres since the 1990s and the contested economics of 
asylum in Australia today. Behrooz Boochani, for example, has similarly refused to 
pathologize his emotional experience of Australia’s offshore detention regime and instead 
locates his pain, and that of his fellow refugees, within Australia’s neo-colonial relations with 
PNG authorities and people, including the logics of imperial profit-seeking and extraction: 
‘Only a meta-historical and transhistorical approach can unpack the peculiarities 
associated with the issue of Manus and Nauru. Only a rigorous analysis of a colonial 
presence in Australia and its tactics in the region can disclose the reality of violence in 
these island prisons…. This form of affliction, inflicted on people in similarly 
vulnerable situations, has always existed in the history of modern Australia. Pain and 
suffering systematically inflicted on defenceless and vulnerable bodies.’55  
As Maurice Stierl has argued, holding onto the ambiguities of migrant struggles allows for an 
understanding of migrant protagonists as ‘complex subjects, subjects able to be traumatised 
and resistant, scared and hopeful, captured and recalcitrant’.56 Similarly, as I suggest in this 
chapter, instances of refugee claim-making in legal settings constitute a form of political 
action that fed into broader struggles for articulating relationships of political, moral and legal 
responsibility in relation to both state authorities and the private corporations that states 
engage in an attempt to outsource their liability toward asylum seekers and refugees. While 
legal actions of negligence or false imprisonment rest upon a claim of injury, the men 
detained at the Manus Island RPC were able to strategically mobilise their claims to reshape 
the broader political contestations around the legality and legitimacy of Australia’s detention 
regime. Using a range of tactics, including social media to amplify their struggles and 
demands, the men subject to Australia’s carceral violence challenged the state of legal limbo 
and political abandonment in which they had long been subjected. 
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